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Abstract 
An emergent form of political economy, facilitated by information and 
communication technologies (ICTs), is widely propagated as the apotheosis of 
unmitigated social, economic, and technological progress. Meanwhile, throughout the 
world, social degradation and economic inequality are increasing logarithmically. 
Valued categories of thought are, axiomatically, the basic commodities of the 
“knowledge economy”. Language is its means of exchange. This paper proposes a 
sociolinguistic method with which to critically engage the hyperbole of the 
“Information Age”. The method is grounded in a systemic social theory that 
synthesises aspects of autopoiesis and Marxist political economy. A trade policy 
statement is analysed to exemplify the sociolinguistically created aberrations that are 
today most often construed as social and political determinants.  
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Introduction 
This special issue responds to a confluence of historically specific social and 
technological phenomena that not only presents new challenges for communication 
scholarship, but also places it at the centre of a new form of political economy: the so 
called “knowledge economy” 1. Language, by which I mean spoken, written, or 
signed words, is intrinsic to social acceptance of, and engagement with, the putatively 
immutable trend towards this new economy. Indeed, a central assertion of this paper 
is that language is as fundamental to the operation of a knowledge economy as it is to 
thought, identity, history, and human societies tout court. That language is 
fundamental to human societies is not a new assertion, but I restate its importance 
here to draw attention to the ahistorical assumptions which underpin the knowledge 
economy’s utopian propaganda, focus, and rationale. 
Throughout the twentieth century, communication technologies have 
followed an historically seamless trajectory of convergence, both in terms of the 
technologies themselves, and in terms of the media monopolies that have 
manipulated them. Media that have hitherto operated within discrete social domains 
continue to converge within traditionally disparate contexts, thus dissolving 
perceived boundaries between them. Traditional workplaces, including farms, 
factories, and offices, make increasing use of ICTs. This network of technological 
infrastructures is increasingly dominated by the culture industries: mass media 
corporations whose influence spans the globe. The digital ‘convergence’ of 
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workplace technologies with those of the culture industries suggests that persons in 
the workplace are increasingly exposed to the proprietary intentions of transnational 
culture industries whose all-pervading influence now extends directly into the 
workplace, just as it does in the home.  
An autopoietic-sociolinguistic understanding of social meaning making 
provides a critical understanding of the centrality of language to the human social 
condition at a period in history in which thought and language are the basic 
commodity forms of a “globalised” knowledge economy. From an autopoietic 
perspective, human knowledge is the product of a cognitive relationship between 
persons operating on and within social and physical environments. Where human 
knowledge and political economy are concerned, language is both a means of 
production and exchange. The basic commodity-form of the knowledge economy, 
then, may be defined as a cognitive distinction that can be exchanged between people 
in more or less valued forms of language. Ultimately, the knowledge-value of any 
particular distinction, or set of distinctions, is mediated by the language used to 
describe it. The role of language in human societies therefore contains its own 
imperative as the focus for communication research. This is especially so where the 
research must straddle traditionally divergent sub-disciplines of communication 
research as a consequence of increasingly blurred boundaries between the social 
contexts within which these sub-disciplines developed.  
                                                                                                                                          
1 Generally speaking, the terms information economy and knowledge economy are used interchangeably. 
For clarity, I use the term knowledge economy except when citing other sources.  
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The social contours of the emerging knowledge economy 
In the comparatively well-developed countries of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the use of ICTs in the workplace 
increased from ‘less than a quarter of workers in the mid-1980s to between 40 to 56 
per cent of workers by the mid-1990s’ (OECD, 1998, p. 3). ICT usage is most 
common among ‘high-skill occupations such as administrative, managerial, and 
professional workers’ (1998, pp. 3-4, original emphasis). But increasingly pervasive 
ICTs do not merely blur boundaries between the workplace and the home, they also 
blur the proprietary distinction between the public and private domains. Throughout 
developed countries, ICTs are used in the bulk of commercial transactions, including 
those made by automatic teller machines, credit card purchases, and point of sale 
transactions. Companies buy and sell the details of such transactions, thus 
commodifying individuals’ purchasing habits, and rendering their ‘absolute 
identities’ as knowledge commodities (Basho, 1998).  
The most monopolised and economically powerful position in the knowledge 
economy is occupied by the culture industry (Walker, 1999). Currently, it has a reach 
many times that of networked ICTs and is the most socially pervasive sector of the 
information economy (Walker, 1999; Wasko, in press). Murdoch’s $US 48 billion 
News network spans the earth, and is driven by entertainment in broadcast and cable 
television, newspaper, radio, film, and internet media networks (Deans, 1998). While 
Murdoch’s network is indisputably big business, it is dwarfed by Disney: the total 
value of the entire South Korea Stock Exchange is now precisely half that of the 
stock value of the Disney Corporation (Walker, 1999). Both News and Disney are 
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multimedia empires. They control print, internet, television, film, and cable television 
interests throughout the world, and produce much of the proprietary content that 
occupies their “virtual” spaces (Deans, 1998; Wasko, forthcoming). But neither 
media monopolies nor ‘convergence’ are new phenomena. Throughout the twentieth 
century, media producers have continued to expand the diversity of their products 
while control of production has become increasingly centralised (Tetzlaff, 1991, p. 
17).  
The knowledge economy is most often described as the result of a revolution 
in communication technologies. Its public propaganda requires nations, businesses, 
and persons subordinate their purposes to the trajectory of these technologies. In 
response, nations throughout the world have, to greater and lesser degrees of 
enthusiasm, reverted to essentially neo-classical economic policies of liberal trade 
and deregulation. The result of such policy shifts has been increasing amounts of 
economic inequality and social dislocations (Bauman, 1998). These dislocations are 
most often explained away under the rubric of “globalisation”, a polysemic term 
which eludes comprehensible definition precisely because of its all-encompassing 
objective. Globalisation is often attributed as the “rational” basis for broad-based 
policy shifts by governments, businesses, and multilateral policy institutions alike. 
Typically, such institutions espouse the apparently immutable benefits of 
globalisation, triumphally ascribing it with the unmitigated virtues of social, political, 
economic, and technological progress. Such triumphalism, however, uncritically 
ignores evidence of the increasing inequalities and dislocations that accompany 
globalised capitalism.  
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To engage the triumphalisms of globalisation and its knowledge economy, I 
provide a sociolinguistic perspective that views human communities as living 
systems situated in historically specific relations of production and power. After 
elaborating the cohesiveness of the theory and method I outline here, I analyse a short 
text to demonstrate the paradoxical role that commodified thought and language 
plays in objectifying and obscuring relationships within society. The analysis focuses 
on the emerging, discursively constructed agents that are allowed, and often forced, 
to play determining roles in the public policies and propaganda of the “information 
age". From the theoretical perspective I present here, the knowledge economy – 
precisely because its commodity-forms are exchanged through more and less 
valuable languages – may be seen as less a technologically determined phenomenon 
and more a political economy of language, thought, and technology. 
Theoretical orientation: Producing commodities for the knowledge economy 
In human social systems, a sociocognitive metabolism emerges because of the 
relationship between people and their material and social environments. Marx (1970) 
describes a ‘social metabolism … which gives rise to definite social relations’ (pp. 
51-52). Here, he specifically refers to the exchange of material commodities, socially 
useful things that derive exchange-value from their usefulness; the socially necessary 
labour time to produce these; and the social relations that this arrangement entails at 
any given point in history (1970, pp. 50-51; 1976, p. 125). Here, I disregard the 
material2 commodities of the social metabolism – like, for instance, golf balls or 
                                                 
2 Material, in this sense, might best be defined as physico-chemically constituted. 
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sausages – which have a tangible form that is relatively fixed over a period of time. 
Rather, I address the social metabolism of intangible, ephemeral, and abstract 
sociocognitive commodities of the knowledge economy: thought and language. In 
language, and with other sociocognitive artefacts like image and music, people render 
their environments socially meaningful. The sociocognitive metabolism, then, is the 
entire network of interactions and processes through which people produce socially 
significant, socially exchangeable meaning. While I acknowledge that humans make 
meaning with ‘every sort of object, event and action in so far as it is endowed with 
significance, with symbolic value’ (Lemke, 1995, p. 9, emphasis added), I argue that 
within this metabolism, the domain of language is the domain in which social 
perceptions of value and power are created and mediated (Lemke, 1998; Martin, 
1997; Martin, 1999). With the advent of the knowledge economy, the immediacy of 
language, combined with its evaluative dimensions and accelerated propagation, the 
self-promoting value systems of knowledge commodities are free to act upon 
themselves, increasing their value at the speed of light in a globally integrated 
technological system of self-valorising commodities which are exchanged in more 
and less valued dialects of language.  
Credit derivatives are exemplary of the knowledge economy’s most abstract 
and exclusive commodity forms. Put as simply as possible, they are a form of 
insurance on future or ‘notional’3 debt which is incurred, in most cases, only upon a 
verified “credit event” which may or may not trigger a valuation in a credit 
derivative. These financial sector commodities are exchanged without any clear 
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understanding or agreement about exactly what they are (Edwardes, 1998a, 1998b). 
Indeed, they are hard for people ‘without a Nobel Prize in mathematics’ to 
understand (Kohler, 1998). Nevertheless, trade in these pure abstractions generated 
$US 20 billion dollars in 1996, twice as much in 1997, and is expected to exceed 
$US 100 billion per year by 2001 (Edwardes, 1998a). Credit derivatives exemplify 
the commodity-forms of thought that sustain the knowledge economy, and the 
valorised social communities within which they are produced. By viewing thought 
and language as commodities, my intention is not to endorse their economic 
appropriation, but rather to draw attention to the fact that, with the advent of a 
knowledge economy, these artefacts are commodities. Indeed, concomitant with all-
pervading ICTs in the West, the knowledge economy operates by commodifying 
‘[e]very nook and cranny of social life’ (Robinson, 1996, in Kennedy, 1998), 
including birth, death, sex, identity, and opinion.  
The historical trajectory of value and its relationship with commodity forms. 
Value has played an increasingly objectifying role throughout the 
technologisation of societies. Marx argued that a commodity’s exchange-value is 
directly related to its social utility, or ‘use-value’, which ‘through its qualities 
satisfies human needs of whatever kind’ (1976, p. 125). While recognising the 
importance of the ‘production of ideas’ (1846/1972, pp. 118-119), Marx’s analysis of 
Capital (1970, 1976, 1978, 1981) focuses predominantly on material labour and 
commodities rather than ‘mental production’ (1976, p. 126). Nevertheless, he notes 
                                                                                                                                          
3 Notional is meant quite literally. That is, it only exists in the form of a hypothetical possibility. 
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the quasi-religious relationships between them. The commodities of the knowledge 
economy can be compared with religious artefacts because, in the knowledge 
economy,  
the products of the human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life 
of their own, which enter into relations both with each other and with the human 
race. So it is in the world of commodities … I call this the fetishism which attaches 
itself to the products of labour as soon as they are produced as commodities, and is 
therefore inseparable from the production of commodities (Marx, 1976, p. 165). 
The diachronic transition from the concrete commodity-forms of Marx’s day 
to the more abstract cultural commodities of late capitalism creates an increased 
immediacy [that] takes the place of the mediated, exchange-value itself. If the 
commodity in general combines exchange-value and use value, then the pure use 
value, whose illusion the cultural goods must preserve in a completely capitalist 
society, must be replaced by pure exchange-value, which precisely in its capacity of 
exchange-value deceptively takes over the function of use value (Adorno, 1991, p. 
34). 
As communication technologies expose increasingly intimate aspects of 
human social relationships to commodification, exchange-value appears to play an 
increasingly powerful role in society. Hypercapitalism (Graham, 1999) is the 
evolutionary point in the trajectory of exchange societies at which ‘thought becomes 
a commodity, and language the means of promoting that commodity’ (Horkheimer & 
Adorno 1944/1998, pp. xi-xii). The primacy of exchange-value has advanced to the 
degree that our illusory system of economic value mediates social utility, rather than 
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vice-versa. In the knowledge economy, the products of the human imagination, 
including particular “types” of thought, the language used to convey these, and the 
perceived value of these two socially inseparable phenomena, are commodities.  
An economy that is concerned with the exchange of more and less valuable 
forms of knowledge presupposes more and less valuable forms of language and vice 
versa: ‘[l]anguage makes power; power gets valued’ (Martin, 1998, p. 429). 
Valorised dialects can, indeed, be presented and understood as values in and of 
themselves (Gal, 1989, pp. 350-355; Lemke, 1995, chap. 4; Martin, 1998). Today, 
such dialects include those used by scientists, mathematicians, economists, business 
administrators, politicians, technologists, and so on (cf. Martin, 1998). The dialects 
of power provide ‘access to material resources’ and are, unquestionably, materially 
produced, ‘socially embedded’ practices (Gal, 1989, p. 352) with a specific function 
in society (Martin, 1998). In being exchanged, the products of valorised dialects 
produce and reproduce specific, though not immutable, social relations. This a direct 
function of the sociocognitive metabolism and the social relations that sociocognitive 
exchanges both engender and entail. In the following section I therefore elucidate an 
autopoietic view of social systems and the role that language plays in constituting 
these systems.  
Autopoiesis, sociolinguistics, and living systems 
The organismic metaphor of a ‘social metabolism’ may suggest a Parsonian, 
functionalist view of society-as-organism (Douglas, 1973, p. 81). I assume the 
contrary. While societies may be defined as living systems, they are necessarily meta-
organismic collections of complex, dynamically related processes, structures, and 
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participants with emergent properties and characteristics that are distinct from those 
of the organisms that constitute them. Human social systems, then, may be viewed as 
third-order4, meta-organismic, living systems. The presence of autopoietic 
organisation - or self-producing and reproducing processes - within a system is both 
necessary and sufficient to classify a system as living and vice versa (cf. Maturana & 
Varela, 1980, 1987; Varela, 1992). The importance of autopoiesis to the argument I 
present here lies in Maturana and Varela’s assertion that human beings’ autopoiesis 
is made possible within an interrelated network of social environments that are 
created, coordinated, and maintained in the domain of language (1980, pp. 107-108; 
1987, pp. 230-231; Maturana, 1995).  
Systemic cognition is an emergent property of any living system because of 
the need for continual distinctions to be made by a system between itself and its 
environment (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 9). Because human social and cognitive 
systems are constituted, coordinated, and maintained in the domain of language, and 
because language is a fundamentally social phenomenon, sociolinguistics provides 
the most appropriate analytical tools for understanding the systemic and intrinsically 
creative role of language in human social systems (Graham & McKenna, in press). 
This is because, to study the way knowledge is created by living systems, ‘[w]e are 
forced to discover “regions” that interweave in complex manners, and, in the case of 
humans, that extend beyond the strict confines of the body into the socio-linguistic 
register’ (Varela, 1992, p. 14).  
                                                 
4 First-order living systems are unicellular. Second-order systems are meta-cellular organisms. Third-order 
systems are social systems of meta-cellular organisms (cf. Maturana & Varela, 1980, 1987). 
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The knowledge economy, then, conflates cognition (and recognition), the 
intrinsic property of any living system, with language, the ultimately coordinating, 
intrinsically creative social phenomenon in human societies. The human tendency to 
reify and anthropomorphise sociocognitive creations often leads us to see ourselves 
as being separate from, or alien to, the language that we live in and the distinctions 
that we make in language. Consequently,  
we live existing in our language as if language were a symbolic system for referring 
to entities of different kinds that exist independently from what we do, and we treat 
even ourselves as if we existed outside language as independent entities that use 
language. … The main consequence of our existing in language is that we cannot 
speak about what is outside it (Maturana, 1995).  
By conflating cognition, language, and political economy, the knowledge 
economy allows the sociocognitive, sociolinguistic creations of expert dialects to 
operate as reified abstractions that can be appropriated, bought, deployed, and sold 
within the proprietary domains of the knowledge economy’s infrastructure. That is, 
by providing the technical means to produce a global system of self-valorising 
abstractions, including credit derivatives, call warrants, roubles, and baht, the 
globalised technological infrastructure of the knowledge economy facilitates the 
global propagation of thought, value, and power, which is ultimately packaged and 
sold in language. Now, more than ever, ‘language is practical consciousness’ (Marx 
& Engels, 1846/1972, p. 122, original emphasis). Thus, the knowledge economy can 
also be seen as the form of political economy in which identity itself becomes a 
product, because the environment of language also provides the resources with which 
humans constitute their self-descriptions. Human social systems also maintain their 
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identity in language. It is the means by which communities ‘build solidarity, patrol 
and extend their boundaries, and perpetuate themselves in the life of a general 
culture’ (Killingsworth & Gilbertson, in McKenna, 1997, p. 191). Thus, a 
sociolinguistic analysis of human social systems is consistent with the fundamental 
tenets of autopoiesis, and it can confront the complexities of the knowledge 
economy. 
Autopoiesis and sociolinguistics 
To maintain consistency with the systemic framework I have outlined above, I 
employ an analytical framework based in the sociolinguistic field of ‘critical 
discourse5 analysis’ (Fairclough, 1989, chaps. 5-6; 1992, chap. 1; 1995, chaps. 2, 5; 
Gee, 1992, p. 115; Gee & Lankshear, 1995; Halliday, 1978, pp. 113-114; Lemke, 
1995, chaps. 1-4; McKenna, 1997, 1999; McKenna & Graham, 1999; van Dijk, 
1994). Critical discourse analysis treats social systems as ‘discourse’ or ‘speech’ 
communities (Gal, 1989; Lemke, 1995, p. 41). Sociolinguistic practices, including 
the way members of a speech community define and describe themselves and the 
environments they inhabit, define the boundaries of a given community, its 
relationships with its environment, and the attitudes of the community towards these. 
Critical discourse analysis recognises that ‘[e]ach community, each discourse 
                                                 
5 In this section concerning sociolinguistics, I use the terms discourse and language interchangeably. I do 
so realising that discourse is a contested term. I define discourse analysis as the analysis of ‘extended 
samples of spoken or written text’ for the purpose of understanding how language is used in particular 
social contexts to produce, reproduce, maintain, and change social structures and practices (Fairclough, 
1992, p. 3, chap. 3).  
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tradition, has its own canons of intertextuality6, its own principles and customs 
regarding which texts are most relevant to the interpretation of any one text’ (Lemke, 
1995, p. 41). A corollary to this perspective is that the basic unit of analysis for 
meaning cannot be words or “signs”, but rather, the thematic diversity of language 
practices becomes the focus for sociolinguistics, and the most basic level of analysis 
becomes the clause.  
Method, data, and analysis  
My chosen sociolinguistic method, which can only briefly outline here, draws 
from various approaches to sociolinguistic analysis that have their disciplinary roots 
in social anthropology (e.g. Bourdieu, 1984, 1993; Emerson & Holquist, 1986; 
Holquist, 1981; Gal, 1989; Halliday, 1978, 1994; Lemke, 1995, 1998; Martin, 1997, 
1998, 1999; McKenna, 1999). Lemke describes the basis of the method most 
succinctly. It focuses on three interdependent aspects of language: presentational, 
orientational, and organisational. 
Presentational 
The presentational aspects of language are the ways language is used within a 
particular community to construe things in the natural or social domains by their 
‘explicit descriptions as participants, processes, relations and circumstances standing 
in particular semantic relations to one another’ (Lemke, 1995, p. 41). Presentational 
refers to the actual words that a community typically uses to describe aspects of its 
                                                 
6 Lemke (1995, p. 22) refers here to Bakhtin’s (in Emerson & Holmquist, 1986) ‘heteroglossia’: That is, the 
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world and the semantic relations between these. For instance, the terms ‘political and 
economic management’, ‘globalisation’, and ‘economic sovereignty’ can be 
semantically related in many different ways. How these are arranged will, to varying 
degrees, reveal the discursive traditions of the speaker’s discourse community:  
Globalisation brings in its wake many difficult issues of political and economic 
management. Some see it challenging economic sovereignty. It creates winners and 
losers. (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade [DFAT], 1997, p. 21).  
Contrast this with:  
Sound political and economic management can mitigate the effects of globalisation 
and ensure that the nation’s economic sovereignty is not threatened, and that social 
inequalities are minimised. 
 While each of these statements belong to the genre of public policy 
statements and share a similar lexis, both make implicit assumptions about the 
Participants (in this case, political and economic management, globalisation, 
economic sovereignty); Processes (the verbs that link these); Relations (the 
heteroglossic, or intertextual “voices”, in the text); and the Circumstances in which 
the “action” takes place. These assumptions become more apparent when the 
orientational aspects of language are considered.  
                                                                                                                                          
range of ‘social voices’ from which a discourse community traditionally chooses in interpreting and 
describing its world (cf. also Fairclough, 1992, chap. 4). 
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Orientational 
The orientational aspects of community’s language refers to how the 
community uses language to orient itself attitudinally to others, and to the 
presentational content of its own language (Lemke, 1995, p. 41). The orientational 
aspects of the sentences contrasted above highlights the different evaluative 
dimensions of each text. In the DFAT text, globalisation brings effects in its wake. 
The text reveals an evaluation for inevitability and immutability in terms of 
globalisation’s trajectory. It orients the reader to see globalisation as an immutable 
force that impacts on policy and even dictates the fate of persons [it creates winners 
and losers]. The second text, which I have manufactured for the purposes of 
demonstrating these aspects of language, orients the reader to see globalisation as 
being subordinate to policy management, implying that rational, conscious decisions 
can influence outcomes in society. The orientational dimension of language is the 
dimension in which attitudes and evaluations are realised (Lemke, 1998). 
Organisational 
The organisational aspects of language reveals how a community constructs 
‘relations between elements of the discourse itself’ (Lemke, 1995, p. 41). The 
organisational elements of a text create thematic cohesion across long stretches of 
text and often reinforces elements of a discourse community’s thematic formation 
about a given aspect of their discursive universe. For instance, in the DFAT text, the 
following two sentences reinforce the three I have listed above:  
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The power of national governments may become more circumscribed in the future 
but the nation state is far from dead, and sovereignty is still cherished. This is 
unlikely to change over the next fifteen years (DFAT, p. 21). 
These five sentences achieve organisational coherence around a specific, 
though unstated, theme, which is also a proposition and an assumption: Globalisation 
is more powerful than national governments. The purpose of the DFAT text is to 
explain the effects of globalisation and the communications revolution. It relates a 
series of non-human Participants with each other through a series of propositions. 
Agentless propositions (those in which humans do not act) that use identifiers, or 
defining relational Processes (verbs), often allow the Token (that which stands for 
what is to be defined by the relational verb) to reverse its position with the Value 
(that which defines the Token). For example, in the following proposition, the Token 
and Value can shift to either side of the relational Process without raising too much 
alarm in the reader: [1] The impact of globalisation <Token> restricts <Processs> 
national trade policy <Value>. When the Token and Value are reversed around the 
Process, the statement still makes “sense”: [2] National trade policy <Token> 
restricts <Process> the impact of globalisation <Value>. Despite being linguistically 
interchangeable, which is partly due to the way these terms collapse many items and 
processes into a single entity, the two Token/Value positions construe contested 
ideologies and discursive traditions: [1] indicates neo-classical assumptions about the 
primacy of trade; [2] indicates conservative assumptions about the primacy of 
national policy regimes. In the DFAT text, which I analyse further below, a neo-
classic intertextual thematic formation (ITF) provides organisational coherence for 
the text.  
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A method for autopoietic-sociolinguistic analysis 
The method I describe here entails knowledge of a community’s discourse 
traditions. It proceeds on the assumption that, within a given discourse community or 
social system, intertextually constituted ‘thematic patterns … recur from text to text 
in slightly different wordings, but [are] recognisably the same, and can be mapped 
onto a generic semantic pattern that is the same for all’ texts about a particular theme 
(Lemke, 1995, p. 42, original emphasis). These intertextual thematic formations, or 
ITFs, form the organisational foundation of the analysis. Because I assume that social 
cognition and identity is maintained and coordinated in language, the data collection 
method begins with an analysis of systemically produced themes of description, 
propositions and proposals, about itself or aspects of the world that concern it. The 
statements (propositions and proposals) produced by a discourse community about a 
particular subject are firstly analysed thematically and historically in order to assess 
the way the community traditionally construes its world, its attitudes to its own and 
others’ discourses, the way it relates the elements of its discourse to each other, and 
how these have change throughout the history of the community. Once recurring 
propositions about a given subject are distilled into thematic patterns, attitudinal 
coherence between systemically and individually produced propositions within a 
given social system about a given subject can be assessed. These can then be 
analysed at the semantic level to determine the lexico-grammatical features of 
particular social entity, including those concerning value. To briefly demonstrate the 
method, I investigate an exemplar of ‘technocratic discourse’ that characterises the 
current international policy community’s stance on technology, communication, and 
globalisation. 
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Applying the analytical method 
The analysis that follows focuses on a small amount of text produced by 
DFAT (1997, pp. 18-21) that exemplifies policy and “research” statements by 
national and international legislative assemblies about technology, globalisation, and 
the implications of these for social and economic policy. It is organised around a 
recurring ITF in policy statements about technology and globalisation which can be 
identified in texts produced by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD); the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the Whitehouse; the 
Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCT), an Australian Federal Government 
body; the National Office for the Information Economy (NOIE); the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO); and DFAT (McKenna & Graham, 1999). The ITF concerning 
the role of technology in globalised society forms the following semantically circular 
ITF. The underlined words, which are linguistic condensations, are often allowed to 
act in policy statements as anthropomorphs and, in many cases, as deities:  
Communication Technologies revolutionise the way Businesses operate because 
they facilitate Global Trade (or International Trade, International Business Activity, 
or Global Markets). Financial Sector (or the Services Sector) growth, which is 
integral to Economic Growth, depends on Free Trade (or Open Markets, Trade 
Liberalisation, or A Liberal Trading Environment). Free Trade is achieved through 
Deregulation (or Reform). Free Trade creates jobs, freedom, and prosperity and thus 
is good. Financial Sector growth is facilitated and accelerated by improved 
Communication Technologies (sometimes called The Communications Revolution). 
Because communication technologies are revolutionising Global Trade, and because 
Free Trade is desirable and beneficial, Globalisation, which is characterised and 
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facilitated by Free Trade, Communication Technology, and Deregulation, is both 
inevitable and desirable. Therefore national regulatory regimes are anachronistic 
and must be reformed or removed.  
Unfortunately, Globalisation and national regulatory Reforms cause short term 
“social dislocations” (which is a technocratic euphemism for structural 
unemployment, poverty, and social degradation). While these dislocations are 
inevitably offset by long-term gains for the whole Economy, this is not always 
obvious to “the public” (who are always distinct from Business and government and 
usually construed as uninformed). It can make them suspicious about Free Trade 
and Globalisation. But because it creates jobs prosperity and freedom, Free Trade is 
the cure for the social dislocations caused by Globalisation. Therefore, Deregulation 
(free trade or trade liberalisation) must be vigorously pursued if the full benefits of 
Communication Technologies are to be achieved (McKenna & Graham, 1999).  
Each of the propositions in this technocratic ITF, all of which depend on the 
actions of non-human agents, are virtually interchangeable in terms of mutual 
causality for two reasons: firstly because they form an impenetrable circle of 
reasoning. Therefore, the order in which the propositions appear in any given text is 
irrelevant, since each can be causally related with any of the others across a long 
enough stretch of text. Secondly, these non-human agents, which I will call Actors 
here, are highly-compressed, sociolinguistically created and reified, nominalised 
abstractions, and thus may be made to interact with each other in almost any way that 
the technocratic author sees fit. 
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In the National Interest… 
In The National Interest (DFAT, 1997) provides an excellent example of the 
technocratic ITF I describe above. It is a section entitled Globalisation and the 
communications revolution (pp. 18-21). The purpose of the four-page, 50 paragraph, 
900-word text is, apparently, to explain globalisation, the ‘communications 
revolution’, and their combined effects on foreign and trade policy for Australia for 
the next fifteen years. For the sake of brevity, I will limit the analysis to the first six 
sentences of the passage. Even in this short passage, the technocratic features of 
DFAT’s discourse become apparent. Sentences are numbered in [square brackets]; 
Actors are underlined; and nominals, including nominal groups (see below), are 
marked in bold:  
[1] Globalisation has characterised the latter part of the twentieth century and 
will continue into the twenty-first. [2] A defining feature of globalisation is the 
way in which business operates: firms increasingly organise their activities on a 
global scale, forming production chains, including services inputs, that cross 
many countries and greatly increase global flows of trade and investment. [3] 
Globalisation is not new, nor is it just an economic phenomenon: it has important 
political and social dimensions. [4] It is driven by many factors, of which 
technology, the related mobility of people, goods and ideas, and a liberal 
trading environment are perhaps the most important.  
[5] The increasingly global activity of firms has implications for trade and 
policy. [6] It reinforces the importance of open markets and focuses attention on 
national regulatory structures as potential obstacles to the efficient allocation 
of resources through international trade and investment (DFAT, 1997, p. 18).  
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The ITF that pervades international trade policy statements provides 
organisational coherence for the DFAT text: the familiar relationships of the ITF 
“normalise” this passage in terms of it making “sense”. By analysing its 
presentational and attitudinal aspects, the contours of the technocratic, neo-classic 
ideology that underpins DFAT’s statement become apparent.  
Presentational  
The key to understanding how DFAT’s technocratic discourse works is to 
understand the way its linguistic condensations work and how these are allowed to 
interact with one another. Linguistic condensation, or nominalisation, can collapse a 
multitude of themes, Participants, Processes, and Circumstances into a single word, 
like globalisation; or into a nominal group, like the increasingly global activity of 
firms. Once these nominals are created, the author is free to relate them semantically 
in any way he or she sees fit: that is, they may be cast as Processes, Participants, 
and/or Circumstances. In the above text, Globalisation is cast, simultaneously, as a 
Process and a Participant: Globalisation … will continue into the twenty-first 
(century); and as a Circumstance: Globalisation has characterised the latter part of 
the twentieth century. Because globalisation is a nominalised process, it is able to 
dominate the behaviour of the verbs in sentence [1] has characterised and will 
continue. The effect of this is to render its multiple roles as Participant, Process, and 
Circumstance transparent within the sentence. In sentence [3], globalisation appears 
as a multi-dimensional Thing. In essence, sentence [3] says that globalisation affects 
every aspect of society: political, economic, and social. Furthermore, it has done so 
for some unspecified amount of time.  
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The most significant aspect of DFAT’s use of nominals is not the myriad 
themes and processes they collapse, but how they are related to each other 
semantically. The text does not explain globalisation; it valorises Free Trade. It does 
this by drawing intertextually on the circular logic of the ITF that provides 
organisational coherence for the text. This becomes most clear in sentences [4], [5], 
and [6]. In sentence [4], the passively voiced is driven is the central Process. The 
nominalised elements that comprise the driving factors of globalisation are 
technology, the related mobility of people, goods and ideas, and a liberal trading 
environment. Each of these is devoid of human agency. While people are mentioned 
in the nominal group, the mobility of people, they are subordinated to the nominalised 
mobility. People appear (of people) as an adjectival phrase for mobility, which, in 
turn, is subordinated to the trajectory of technology.  
Goods and ideas (tout court) - examples of which might be, respectively, 
cheese puffs and daydreams - are also condensed into a single factor that drives 
globalisation. No further explanation as to why this might be the case is forthcoming. 
Trade liberalisation, the process by which a liberal trading environment is created, is 
also named as a driving factor of globalisation. Here, the author achieves two 
significant causal subordinations: globalisation is causally subordinated to trade 
liberalisation (trade liberalisation causes globalisation), and the mobility of people is 
causally subordinated to technology. Sentences [5] and [6] complete the circularity of 
the argument. In sentence [2], we are told that globalisation is defined by business 
operating internationally which, in turn, creates increased international trade. 
Sentence [5] sets the reader up for the ideological component that is to follow by 
making policy one of the implications of international business activity. Apart from 
Critical Systems Theory  
151 
this rhetorical strategy, the sentence is semantically redundant. The thing that implies 
(has implications for) effects on trade and policy is an abstract Process that contains 
an essential part of its own definition: the increasingly global activity of firms has 
implications for trade: in other words, international trade has implications for trade.  
Sentence [6] delivers the ideological coup de grâce. The reader was set up for 
this in sentence [5]; now here it is. The policy implications we inevitably encounter 
are clearly consistent with the neo-classic ITF that has underpinned Australian 
governments and international policy proponents since the early- to mid-1980s. The 
anaphoric nominals in the text, globalisation, global activity of firms, liberal trading 
environment, are conflated with trade and policy by ambiguous use of the pronoun It. 
Of course, if the antecedent of It is assumed to be the global activity of firms, then 
the sentence is, again, causally circular [the global activity of firms [It] reinforces the 
importance of open markets, which, of course, constitute a liberal trading 
environment, which in turn facilitates the global activity of firms]. It can also be read 
as standing for any of the other nominalised Actors in the text thus far (since this is 
only sentence six): technology, globalisation, the increasingly global activity of 
firms, a liberal trading environment. If it does, in any case, then each of these 
become constitutive of the phenomenon being described. Thus the constituent 
elements of the text are definitively closed to other possibilities without ever 
mentioning what the text renders inactive. 
Having semantically closed off the potential for debate, which was already 
largely achieved by linguistic condensation, the text continues on its own terms, 
leaving us with four incontestable propositions which are revealed by translating 
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sentence [6] using ‘congruent’ structure: that is, the way in which meanings are 
typically realised in everyday language (Martin, 1999, p. 36). Translated to congruent 
structure, sentence [6] says:  
The global activity of firms reinforces the importance of open markets. It also draws 
attention to national regulatory structures. National regulatory structures are 
potential obstacles to international trade and investment. If left unfettered, 
international trade and investment allocate resources efficiently.  
Sentence [6] performs its 29-word feat of semantic terrorism using only two 
Processes (reinforces and focuses). These two Processes relate three complex, highly-
compressed, nominal groups that condense highly-contestable concepts, propositions, 
and processes. In the first statement of fact, sentence [6] proposes that, because firms 
operate within an international trading environment, open markets are important. 
This begs the question: to whom are they important and why? Secondly, the global 
activity of firms focuses attention (a material Process performing a behavioural, 
anthropomorphising function, and which suggests an attentive entity) on national 
regulatory structures…. There is no human agency here, but the sentence conveys the 
easily disputed proposition that national regulatory structures are an unerring 
hindrance to international trade. This is where the text’s ideological underpinning is 
converted into policy imperatives. And, it is all done ex animo, without a human 
being in sight, because it rests upon the “given” that unregulated trade and 
investment allocate resources efficiently. I leave the presentational analysis here with 
every assurance to the reader that the text becomes no more lucid or logical as it 
proceeds towards its inevitable conclusion: that free trade needs to be pursued as a 
Critical Systems Theory  
153 
matter of policy so that the full benefits of technology and globalisation can be 
realised.  
Orientational  
The interdependence of the presentational, orientational, and organisational 
aspects of language are apparent in this analysis. The DFAT text orients both itself 
and the reader to the linguistic relationships of power inscribed in the ITF that 
provides organisational coherence for the knowledge economy’s institutionalised 
propaganda. Essentially, the DFAT text construes people as powerless and invisible 
in the face of its linguistically animated, globally operative social determinants: 
technology, globalisation, and free trade. In fact, individuals, it would appear from 
DFAT’s text, have no part to play in the processes that affect them. The attitudinal 
stance of the latter-day technocratic author is paradoxical in this respect. Neo-
classical economics, as conceived by Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and more recently 
espoused by Friedman and Friedman (1980) and Hayek (1980), bases its claim to 
legitimacy on the “democratic” doctrine of “rational choice”. It does so on behalf of 
the “perfectly rational” individuals it professes to describe. But in DFAT’s neo-
classic universe, the individual has no choice whatsoever, she must defer to the 
trajectories of technology, globalisation, and free trade, all of whom have become 
nominally activated anthropomorphs, and in some cases, immutable deities.  
Talking technology: Hype, Hell, and Hypercapitalism 
The widely-propagated language that espouses the unqualified benefits of 
technological progress most clearly marks it as ideological: the reality it describes 
does not exist except as pure description. Most institutional perspectives on 
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technology, at least in developed countries, ignore the negative or exclusionary 
consequences of technologised society. The NOIE, an Australian Federal government 
body, exemplifies such techno-utopian language, which is most readily identified by 
its dissociative relationship with reality:  
We can all choose to participate at our own pace, in our own time, in our own 
homes, in a truly global economy, a global society. In the global information 
economy, no one, no market, no informationnothing we may need or wantis 
beyond reach. The information economy opens up to us unprecedented convenience, 
flexibility, and choice about how Australians will live, learn, work, create, buy and 
sell (1998, p. 4, emphasis added). 
When measured empirically against the realities of the ‘global society’, the 
NOIE’s language is easily dismissed as utopian fantasy. If there is a global 
knowledge economy, then its constituency’s access to the technological means of 
engagement is definitively inequitable. Indeed, access to the most basic social 
infrastructure remains highly restricted. If the world’s population consisted of 1,000 
people,  
650 would lack a telephone at home. 500 would never have used a telephone. 500 
would have to walk two hours to the nearest telephone. 335 would be illiterate. 333 
would lack access to safe, clean drinking water. 330 would be children. 70 would 
own automobiles. Ten would have a college degree. Only one would own a 
computer (Irving, 1998, emphasis added).  
Rather than being a force for democracy and equality, communication 
technology’s most significant effect has been to expedite an increasing volume of 
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currency transfers and to aid the international organising capabilities, and therefore 
the geographical reach, of transnational corporations (Graham, 1998). Economic 
activity within the digital realm is mostly constituted by the $US 1.3 trillion-per-day7 
global trade in currency (Saul, 1997; Thurow, 1996). In 1995, the entire annual 
global trade in tangible goods generated $US 3.7 trillion (Saul, 1997; Thurow, 1996). 
In other words, currency speculation generates at least 100 times the entire value of 
global trade in tangible goods. Meanwhile, large sections of humanity, hundreds of 
millions of people, are relegated to a living hell (cf. Bauman, 1998; Castells, 1998, 
chapt. 2, esp., pp. 145-165). 
Many developing and developed nations have suffered economic collapse as a 
consequence of hyper-speculation. Latin America, East Asia, and Central Europe all 
endure ongoing social and economic crises largely as a result of ‘casino’ capitalism 
(Bagwell, 1999a). Increasingly pervasive technologies combined with transnational 
demands for diminishing labour costs are directly attributed with increasing levels of 
global unemployment and underemployment, which are now at historically 
unprecedented levels (International Labor Organisation [ILO], 1998, 1999). Children 
are in demand as ‘sexual commodities’ in the ‘booming’ global sex industry 
(Castells, 1998, pp. 154-157). The proliferation of ICTs within the more wealthy 
countries of the world is propelling the child sex industry, which is flourishing in 
developing and developed nations alike (p. 156). At the end of the twentieth century, 
demands for ever-cheaper labour combined with children’s use-value as sexual 
commodities is having the unthinkable effect of increasing child slavery (pp. 152-
                                                 
7 This is a conservative estimate.  
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156). While institutional champions of the knowledge economy argue that social 
degradation is merely ‘coincidental’ with the ascendancy of hypercapitalism (e.g. 
Slaughter & Swagel, 1997), there are clear systemic links between globalised 
capitalism and the destruction of lives throughout the world, ‘from sub-Saharan 
Africa to the United States of America’ (Castells, 1998, p. 159).  
Faced with evidence of economic inequality and social degradation on the one 
hand, and the mass-mediated hyperbole propounding the incontestable, ultimately 
democratising effects of communication technologies on the other, critical language 
research must engage the technological rationality that underpins the knowledge 
economy’s propaganda to understand how language is used to maintain and 
reproduce a system that is definitively exclusive and inequitable. In the following 
paragraphs, I address four key terms of the ‘knowledge economy’ to show how the 
most widely-propagated concepts of this putative economy are evidence, not of 
substantial social progress, but of an intellectualised, fashionable ideology - 
fashioned and commodified in language - that serves to reinforce a system that has 
become, more than ever, ‘a predator of its own people’ (Castells, 1998, p. 162). 
Interactive  
We are often told that a distinguishing characteristic of new communication 
technologies is that they are interactive. The general understanding of interactive 
media is that people can interact with certain electronically mediated content such as 
CD-Roms, web pages, internet games, and so forth, but not with others – television 
and radio programs for instance. The notion of interactivity, then, appears to be a 
conceptual device for distinguishing between broadcast media and computer 
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mediated content. From the theoretical perspective I present here, life itself, meaning-
making included, is definitively and necessarily interactive: the day you or I cease to 
interact with our world will be the day our friends and family begin to make final 
arrangements for our remains, or at least for our comfortable accommodation. Just as 
people on the internet ‘browse’ the pages of a site by activating textual or image-
based links, people browse libraries, turn the pages of a book, change television 
channels, or indeed, merely look around at the scenery. A person negotiating the 
contents of a web page or a CD-Rom cannot change the content, just as a person 
reading a book cannot change its content. From the perspective of interactivity, the 
sociocognitive contents of a web page, a book, or a movie are metabolised no 
differently from each other: meaning is created in interaction because all meaning-
making is an interactive process. Interactivity, then, is a somewhat misleading term 
for a kind of technological interface that has little to do with the process of meaning-
making which is solely and wholly interactive, even if it entails a person interacting 
with their own descriptions about the world or themselves or whatever. 
Multimedia 
The term ‘multimedia’ is also misleading. It merely situates the 
embeddedness of language in a specific material context, a perspective that has been 
addressed by conscientious language scholars since well before the Christian era, as 
have the aesthetic trappings of communication design (Grote, 1872, pp. 1-67). Like 
the term interactive, multimedia is more about interface than meaning-making itself. 
Meaning-making has always, quite necessarily, been multimediated and 
“multimodal”. However, regardless of the multiple technologies, or media, through 
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which humans exchange meaning, language remains the only human process that can 
discuss and coordinate its own meaning and social significance, as well as that of 
other socially significant artefacts. While images and music can intertextually 
incorporate and reconfigure preceding material to make new meaning, their capacity 
to recursively regulate their own meaning is limited to the production process: image 
and music are, themselves, communication technologies. As with all human artefacts, 
they are endowed with social significance in language. Images cannot explain their 
own meaning. And, just as music cannot explain what it means; the medium on, or 
with which a text is written cannot explain the meaning of the text it carries. While I 
acknowledge that images, music, sounds, and media do have an effect on how 
language is perceived, and indeed, music, images, and sounds can often express 
aspects of human experience that language perhaps cannot, I maintain that their 
social value is ultimately subject to the language used to describe them in any given 
social context.  
The crucial aspect of any particular medium for critical language is how its 
materiality affects or limits the meaning potential of language by the way language is 
used within it, and how language shapes the social significance - the socially 
perceived value - of the medium and its content. Despite claims to the contrary, the 
medium is not the message. Whilst the meaning of a medium can be interpreted, as 
may the meaning of a sausage or a golf ball, a medium remains merely a medium, an 
ultimately passive thoroughfare for some content or other. Its meaning and value is 
continually contested and negotiated in language. Thus, multimedia is a term more 
suited to the advertising propaganda designed for selling computer technology than it 
is to the study of meaning-making.  
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Convergence 
The latest buzzword to explain the trajectory of digital technologies is 
convergence. The word ‘convergence’ is given to mean that the culture industries, the 
internets, and the telecommunications networks, once they are completely digitised, 
will form a seamless, globally integrated network of “interactive”, “multimedia” 
communication technologies. In respect of the knowledge economy, communication 
technology is a passive prosthetic rather than an initiating source of wealth. This is 
because human knowledge is a product of a fundamentally communicative system of 
interactions: society. Here, the implications for convergence become apparent: it 
means increasing concentrations of control in a communicative, economically driven 
system of heavily monopolised media organisations in a society which is firstly 
communicative. Any excitement about “convergence”, an historically seamless 
process, can be attributed to the increasingly monopolised control of a technological 
apparatus that thrives on its own self-aggrandising propaganda. In this respect, 
convergence has much in common with the much-touted but poorly-explained 
concept of globalisation. 
Globalisation 
Communication technologies and neo-classic notions of “free trade” play the 
main facilitating roles in the literature that attempts to explain the apparently 
immutable trajectory of globalisation, which is more a sociolinguistic aberration than 
a meaningful phenomenon. Because of the organisational advantages provided by 
communication technologies, and its collocation with free trade, globalisation is 
assumed by its protagonists to provide increasing amounts of ‘freedom’, ‘wealth’, 
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and ‘choice’. To date, the material effects of globalisation, for most people, have 
been precisely the opposite. While its proponents wryly concede that globalisation 
has its ‘adjustment costs’, and inevitably ‘creates winners and losers’, they assert that 
such costs are far outweighed by far the benefits of globalisation which are ‘so 
clearly proved by the theory of comparative advantage’ (JSCT, 1999, p. 11). As in all 
ideology, abstract theory dictates that to which reality refuses to accede.  
My criticisms of “globalisation”, especially when framed by aspects of 
Marxism, would seem all the less credible were it not the case that George Soros, an 
exemplar of speculative success, predicts ‘the imminent disintegration of the global 
capitalist system’ because of its ‘inherent instability’ (Soros, 1999, in Hartcher, 
1999). This is Soros; not Marx, and ‘he’s a man who ought to know, having earned 
billions from such speculation’ (Schroeder, 1999, in Bagwell, 1999b). Of course, 
‘[w]here speculation ends - in real life - there, real, positive science begins: the 
representation of the practical activity, of the practical process’ by which humans 
produce and reproduce the historically specific conditions in which they live (Marx, 
1846/1972, p. 119).  
This is critical theory’s focus. If there is a global society, it is definitively 
inequitable. If there is a knowledge economy, then it is an exclusive economy in 
which illusions are produced, appropriated, valorised, and exchanged in a 
technologically mediated, globally integrated system of technologies. This system of 
communication, in turn, propagates the ideological language which sustains it. The 
ultimately mediating, ultimately coordinating communicative environment for human 
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social systems is language. The much-valued language of knowledge, and therefore 
of power, is a language that requires constant critique.  
Conclusions  
The theoretical and analytical perspective I have outlined here highlights the 
inseparable relatedness of language, thought, identity, history, and society. Each of 
these factors interdependently creates the circumstances of instantiation for each of 
the others. Language is the processual, socially interactive phenomenon that 
coordinates, contests, describes, creates, and exchanges the sociocognitive 
understandings which emerge from each instance of humanity, and which mediates 
the production and reproduction of the social systems within which these occur. 
Social systems are, in turn, the environment in which humans flourish, albeit to 
widely varying degrees of satisfaction and success. Language is an empirical and 
constitutive process. It facilitates the socially shared distinctions by which we come 
to know and describe our world, our societies, and ourselves. At a time in history 
when little, if anything, in Western society remains outside the technological 
apparatus that expedites increasing concentrations of communicative and economic 
power, critical language studies must try to understand and thereby challenge the 
meaning of the medium and the degree to which it operates as a dominating influence 
on social consciousness. Language, by its very nature, is the only means we have to 
address these critical issues. 
By putting forward my critique of techno-hyperbole, I risk being labelled as a 
Luddite or a technophobe. To the contrary, I enjoy the benefits of computer 
technologies, they are useful tools. I do not criticise technologies, and I acknowledge 
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my privilege in having access to them. Rather, I criticise the obfuscating propaganda 
that communication technology’s global sales team uses, and the social system that 
currently comes pre-packaged with technologised ‘globalisation’ as a non-optional, 
concomitant extra. It is my hope that this paper, and this special issue, will extend the 
capacity for critical language scholarship to engage the techno-deterministic 
hyperbole of the “Information Age”. 
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